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Out Of The Goodness Of My Heart, I Give You This Child 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Advancements in medical technology have improved many areas of the medical field, 
allowing doctors to discover new treatments and procedures to benefit the health and needs of 
patients. One area that has continued to advance is assisted reproductive technology.1 As a result 
of the advancement, the number of people using assisted reproductive technology has increased.2 
Approximately 8% of women in the United States will seek infertility treatment and the 
assistance of technology to become or stay pregnant.3 One form of assisted reproductive 
technology that has expanded with the advancement of technology is surrogacy.4  
The use of surrogates in the United States has enabled couples previously unable to 
conceive or carry a child of their own to become parents and start a family.5 There are two types 
of surrogacy agreements: traditional and gestational.6 Both traditional and gestational surrogacy 
agreements present moral, ethical and legal problems that the courts and legislatures are forced 
to address.7 In order to address the public policy and legal concerns of surrogacy, this paper 
                                                 
1 John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental 
Rights, 66 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 355 (1991) (noting that within the past two decades, the development of reproductive 
technology has now separated the two processes of conception and gestation). 
2 Naomi Cahn, Do Tell the Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV.1077, 1082 (2014) (noting 
that the use of infertility services is increasing).  
3 Id. at 1081 (nothing the number of women in the United States experiencing infertility).  
4 See generally, Hill, supra note 1, at 554-55 (noting that advancements in surrogacy now provide for the potential 
of five parents and 16 parental combinations). 
5 Alyssa James, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: Why Indiana Should Honor Them and What Physicians Should 
Know Until They Do, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 175, 176 (2013) (arguing that surrogacy has allowed infertile women 
in the United States to become parents). 
6 Mark Strasser, Traditional Surrogacy Contracts, Partial Enforcement, and the Challenge for Family Law , 18 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 85, 87-88 (2015) (explaining the two types of surrogacy procedures).  
7 Christine Metteer Lorillard, Informed Choices and Uniform Decisions: Adopting the ABA’s Self-Enforcing 
Administrative Model to Ensure Successful Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 237, 238 (2010) 
(explaining that even though surrogacy and the number of couples choosing to use reproductive technologies to 
reproduce are faced with the moral, economic and legal obstacles these technologies produce).   
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argues that the United States should adopt a model similar to the United Kingdom’s model of 
surrogacy agreements, and develop a uniform act that bans commercial surrogacy and requires 
that surrogacy agreements be based on altruistic motives.  
Part II will examine the moral, ethical and legal concerns of surrogacy agreements that 
arise for the children born of a surrogacy agreement, to the surrogate, and the harms and 
concerns to the intended parents. In determining the current law in different jurisdictions 
throughout the United States, Part III will examine how courts have determined whether 
surrogacy arrangements are valid and enforceable. Part IV of the paper will examine the United 
Kingdom’s approach to surrogacy agreements as well as the potential problems with the model 
the United Kingdom has implemented. Finally, Part V proposes that the United States should 
adopt a model similar to the United Kingdom’s surrogacy agreement approach, and adopt a 
uniform surrogacy act that prohibits commercial surrogacy and requires altruistic motivations for 
entering into the agreement. 
II. Moral, Ethical, Social and Legal Concerns of Surrogacy 
As advanced reproductive technologies have become more sophisticated, surrogacy has 
emerged as possible method to assist couples in beginning a family.8 However, surrogacy 
agreements are controversial because they present moral, ethical social and legal concerns for all 
of the parties involved in the agreement.9 The parties involved that could be victimized by the 
surrogacy agreements include the unborn fetus, the surrogate women, and the intended parents.10 
In order to understand the moral, ethical, social and legal concerns surrounding surrogacy 
                                                 
8 Id. at 242 (explaining that surrogacy is a relatively new advancement, only becoming widely available in the 
1980s). 
9 Id.  
10  Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate- Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 18 CARDOZO 
J.L. & GENDER 391, 398-409 (2012) (describing the concerns of surrogacy and the harms that could arise to the 
parties involved in the contract and the unborn fetus).  
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agreements, it is important to understand what surrogacy is and the two types of surrogacy 
agreements available. 
Surrogacy is an agreement entered into by a woman, the surrogate, which provides that 
the surrogate will become pregnant and gestate a fetus on behalf of the intended parents.11 The 
two types of surrogacy agreements are: traditional and gestational.12 A traditional surrogate 
becomes pregnant via artificial insemination with the contracting father’s sperm or donor 
sperm.13 The donor sperm can be either from an anonymous or a known donor.14 Further, in 
traditional surrogacy, the surrogate provides the ovum, creating a genetic and biological link 
between the surrogate and the child.15 Alternatively, in a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate has 
no genetic link to the child.16 Rather, the intended parents supply either their own or a donor’s 
ovum, which is then fertilized with the intended father’s or donor sperm and the resulting 
embryo is implanted in the gestational surrogate’s uterus.17  The gestational surrogate then 
carries the embryo to term, creating only a biological link to the child.18 Both traditional and 
gestational surrogacy arrangements pose moral, ethical and legal concerns for the parties 
involved.19  
A. Harm to the Unborn Fetus 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See generally, Strasser, supra note 6, at 87-88. (describing the two kinds of surrogacy: traditional and gestational). 
12 Id.  
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.  
16 See, London, supra note 10, at 394. (explaining the biological and genetic relationship between the parties of the 
surrogacy agreement and the unborn fetus in each of the two types of surrogacy arrangement).  
17 Id.  
18 Id. 
19 See, Lorillard, supra note 7, at 238. 
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Baby Selling 
One of the prominent concerns in the surrogacy debate is that surrogacy equates to 
commodification of children.20 In surrogacy agreements, the surrogate typically receives 
compensation solely for rendering services.21 However, because the payment to the surrogate is 
contingent upon the surrogate relinquishing custody of the child, opponents claim that the 
payment for services rendered is a proxy for illegal baby selling.22  Further, critics also claim that 
surrogacy degrades children by treating them as merchandise that can easily be sold for a 
profit.23  
The fear that surrogacy constitutes baby- selling has been a central reason given by courts 
for invalidating surrogacy agreements.24 Surrogacy entered the national legal discourse in the 
New Jersey Supreme Court case, In re Baby M, discussed in greater detail in Part III.25 In their 
holding, the New Jersey Supreme Court invalidated and refused to enforce a surrogacy contract 
because it was void against public policy and conflicted with the state statute.26  The court noted 
that New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 9:3-54a, prohibits the paying for or accepting money in connection 
with any placement of a child for adoption.27 The court reasoned that baby-selling has inherent 
evils for the child, because the child is sold without regard for whether the purchasers will be 
                                                 
20 E.g., London, supra note 10, at 498-400 (presenting opposing views regarding baby-selling in regards to 
surrogacy agreements).  
21 Id. at 498.  
22 Id. (arguing that opponents of surrogacy do not view the payment received by the surrogates is for their services 
rendered, but rather, the surrogates are actually receiving the payment in exchange for a child, constituting a sale of 
the child).  
23 Elizabeth S. Scott, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in Forbidden Exchange: Surrogacy and the Politics of 
Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP . PROB. 109, 112 (2009) (describing the view proposed by opponents of 
surrogacy during the In re Baby M case).  
24 See, In re Baby M, 109 N.J. 396, 423-25 (N.J. 1988). 
25 E.g., Yehezkel Margalit, In Defense of Surrogacy Agreements: A Modern Contract Perspective , 20 WM. & MARY 
J. OF WOMEN & L. 423, 428 (2014).   
26 See generally, In re Baby M, supra note 24 at 430-36 (arguing that the agreement was in violation of the state 
statute which prohibited the exchange of money for a child within the state and was against public policy because it 
promotes the permanent separation of the child from one of its natural parents).  
27 See, Id. at 423. (explaining that New Jersey state statute prohibits the exchange of money for a child); See also, 
N.J. Stat. § 9:3-54. 
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suitable parents.28 Further, the court held that it is in the best interest of the child to remain with 
their natural parents, which critics of surrogacy have argued allows the mother-child relationship 
to foster by allowing the child the opportunity bond with the women.29 
B. Harm to the Surrogate 
Commodification of Women 
In addition to the commodification of children, opposition to surrogacy also rests on the 
belief that surrogacy is the commodification of a woman’s body.30  Opponents claim that 
surrogacy is a form of prostitution.31 Third parties, such as fertility treatment clinics, that foster 
the relationship between the intended parents and surrogates act as “pimps” who sell the 
reproductive ability of women.32 Instead of embracing the unique capability of a woman’s body 
to bear a child, they reduce it to a commodity and rent the womb for nine months at a time.33  
Surrogacy agreements are also opposed on the assertion that surrogacy constitutes 
reproductive slavery.34 Surrogacy is an expensive process to endure and costs thousands of 
dollars.35 As a result, women of higher socioeconomic status, typically Caucasian women, are 
more likely to be able to afford to hire a surrogate of a lower socioeconomic position.36 As many 
                                                 
28 Id. at 425.  
29 Id. at 435 (expressing their desire to keep children with their natural parents and to avoid unnecessary separation 
consistent with adoption law in New Jersey).  
30 Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women or a Commodification of Women’s 
Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 113, 161-62 (1997) (expressing the views of opponents that surrogacy 
is a commodification of a women’s reproductive abilities). 
31 Id.   
32 E.g., Id. at 162 (describing the relationship between the surrogate women and the doctors and lawyers who are in 
the business of fostering relationships in order for profit). 
33 E.g., Id. 
34 Id.  
35 See generally, Circle Surrogacy, Anticipated Costs for Gestational Surrogacy, 
http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/costs  (providing anticipated payment price to participate in gestational surrogacy 
agreements and allowing viewers to individualize situation for a predicated cost of services). 
36 See, London, supra note 10, at 405-06 (arguing that because of the high expense of surrogacy procedures, 
individuals who occupy higher socioeconomic, who tend to be Caucasian, will more likely be able to afford to 
higher a surrogate, which evidence suggests typically tend to occupy lower socioeconomic statuses, composed of a 
large number minorities). 
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minorities tend to occupy the position of lower socioeconomic statuses, minorities once again 
become slaves, providing undervalued services while subjugated to the needs and desires of the 
Caucasian women in society.37  The womb of African American or minority women becomes a 
commodity that the white women can rent for nine months.38 Upon the completion of the task, 
the birth of the child, the minority women are dismissed from the life of the child and the white 
family whom they have provided services for, and become available for the next white family 
that can afford to hire them.39 Because the reproductive technologies are expensive, the minority 
women in lower socioeconomic communities are typically able to provide these services, but the 
lack of ability to afford these services for themselves reinforces notion that surrogacy is a 
method available only for white women and families. 40 
Therefore, minority raced women are exploited because they are expected to provide 
their bodies to upper middle class women who are usually Caucasian, at a monetary rate that is 
undervalued and essentially encouraging reproductive slavery.  
Economic Exploitation 
As stated above, although not empirical, data thus far collected from couples whom are 
exploring the potential use of surrogacy tend to hold professional positions in the workforce, 
while surrogates generally are of a lower socioeconomic status.41 Those that oppose surrogacy 
arrangements fear that women who agree to act as surrogates expose themselves to the risk of 
                                                 
37 See, Id. 
38 See, Id. 
39 See generally, April J. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial Subordination, Gestational 
Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 83 (2001) (comparing the similarities between 
historical treatment of African American women as mothers and slaves to the role of African American women as 
surrogates).  
40 E.g., London, supra note 10, at 408 (describing how “the reproductive rights agendas are shaped by the dynamics 
of class and race.”). 
41 Id. at 405-06. 
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economic exploitation, as many may be in need of the money.42 The financial vulnerability that 
the women in lower socioeconomic classes endure creates the risk that the commissioning 
couples may take advantage, by providing minimal compensation disproportion to the services 
rendered, realizing that these women are desperately in need of any financial payment they can 
obtain.43  
The fear of economic exploitation by fertility clinics is also a concern of many 
opponents. Surrogate pregnancies have been estimated to cost between $80,000 and $120,000 
per pregnancy.44 However, surrogates typically only receive ¼ of the total cost in payment, as 
the base fee compensation for surrogates is between $25,000 and $30,000, subject to increase if 
there are external factors that may increase compensation.45  When examining a $30,000 base 
price that surrogates may receive over a 9 month period, the payment of the surrogates hourly is 
vastly below the federal minimum wage, at approximately $4 per hour.  
Because surrogate women generally occupy a lower socioeconomic status in society, it is 
often difficult for the women to obtain employment.46 Therefore, the potential lack of alternative 
employment surrogates may enter the agreement in order to ensure they have an income, even 
when the payment is low and can cause a health risk.47 
 
                                                 
42 Id. at 406 (explaining that a lack of employment and economic income placed these women in vulnerable where 
positions where their decision to enter into the agreement may no longer be voluntary, but rather what must be done 
to survive). 
43 See, Id. at 408 (arguing that because of the economic status of the commissioning couples, the wealth they can 
offer the surrogate in need of the money, no matter how little in value, may be accepted by the surrogate in order to 
guarantee income). 
44 Christopher White, Surrogate Parenthood for Money if a Form of Human Trafficking , (April 4, 2014) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2012/07/23/the-newest-wave-in-outsourcing-to-india-surrogate-pregnancies/ 
45 See generally, Circle Surrogacy, How Much do Surrogates Get Paid? 
http://www.circlesurrogacy.com/surrogates/how-much-do-surrogates-get-paid (discussing how much surrogates 
usually receive for their services and different factors that may increase or decrease their compensation value). 
46 See, Mark Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Policies , 60 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 135, 141 (1992) (arguing that there must not be any other forms of employment for these women to obtain 
because if they had the choice, they would not become surrogates).      
47 Id.  
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Informed Consent 
Another criticism of surrogacy agreements is that the surrogate may be harmed because 
they are not capable of fully consenting to the surrogacy arrangement.48 Those who believe that 
women are not capable of providing informed consent when entering into a surrogacy agreement 
believe that potential surrogates are unable to grasp the potential psychological risks associated 
with carrying a child.49 This belief is founded on the assumption that a surrogate is not able to 
foresee the possible emotional attachment she may develop with the child during gestation.50 The 
concern that a woman is not capable of providing informed consent was highlighted in the 
decision, In re Baby M, as the reason the surrogate refused to surrender Baby M and terminate 
her parental rights was because she felt a strong bond and connection with the child, as she was 
both the gestational and biological mother.51 Although In re Baby M demonstrates the concern of 
many, empirical studies have found that situations similar to what occurred in In re Baby M is 
not pervasive amongst surrogates.52 
However, the decision to void surrogacy arrangements on the belief that woman are 
incapable of informed consent because they cannot foresee an emotional attachment to the child 
upon the birth perpetuates male dominance in society and allows for the continued exploitation 
of women.53 By entertaining these concerns, the attitude that women in need of a man’s guidance 
                                                 
48 See generally, London, supra note 10, at 400- 02. 
49 Id. at 400 (arguing that pregnancy may result in a psychological connection to the child that a woman cannot 
predict occurring prior to the pregnancy and she therefore cannot give informed consent because she is not capable 
of understanding and comprehending the potential outcomes). 
50 E.g., Id.  
51 See, In re Baby M, supra note 24, at 415 (describing how the surrogate refused to comply with the agreement to 
relinquish the child because she had not anticipated the emotional attachment and bond she felt with t he child). 
52 See, London, supra note 10, at 401 and n.90. (describing empirical evidence concluding that none of the surveyed 
surrogates expressed doubt in regards to their decision to relinquish the child to the intended parents).  
53 See, Id. at 401 (arguing that the advancement of this argument will undermine the feminist theory of self-
autonomy).   
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in order to protect her psychological well-being continues to invade society.54 By continuing to 
endorse the belief that women are incapable of providing informed consent, women’s decision 
making ability will continue to be considered inferior to that of the men’s.55  
C. Harm to the Intended Parents 
Economic exploitation 
Intended parents risk being the victim of economic exploitation different than that of the 
surrogates because the intended parents typically are in a higher socioeconomic class.56  
However, the intended parents are vulnerable to being exploited because of their desire for 
children and to have a family.57 For some example, the desire of intended parent’s to have a child 
via surrogacy costs them their life savings and did not result in a child, as the intended parents 
continued to provide compensation to a fertility clinic based on fraudulent statements made by 
the clinic.58 Unfortunately, by the time the couple realized the scheme, it was already to0 late and 
their vulnerability and desire for a child led to their economic exploitation.59 
Surrogacy arrangements produce ethical, moral and legal problems for society.60 The 
central concerns of surrogacy arrangements revolve around the harm that can result from their 
creation to the child born via a surrogacy arrangement, the surrogate mother, and the intended 
                                                 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See, Julie Shapiro, For a Feminist Considering Surrogacy, Is Compensation Really the Key Question? , 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2014) (arguing that the intended parents typically are in a higher socioeconomic status than the 
surrogate, but the intended parents are still vulnerable to economic exploitation, even if for a different reason).   
57 See, Id. at 1349 n.20 (arguing that intended parents may be economically exploited because of their willingness to 
spend an amount necessary to fulfill their desire to have a child).  
58 See, Tamar Lewin, A Surrogacy Agency that Delivered Heartache, (July 27, 2014),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/28/us/surrogacy-agency-planet-hospital-delivered-heartache.html (explaining how 
a couple unknowingly relied on fraudulent statements and kept providing payment to a fertility clinic that took the 
money but did not provide for a surrogate or child).  
59 Id.  
60 See, Lorillard, supra note 7, at 238.  
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parents of the child.61 Some of the concerns that both opponent and proponents of surrogacy 
have addressed are the commodification of women and children, racial exploitation of surrogate 
women, economic exploitation of both the surrogate mother and the intended parents and 
whether the surrogate woman has the ability to provide informed consent to enter in the 
surrogacy agreement.62 Considering all of the concerns of surrogacy that scholars have eluded to, 
the courts in the United States have been attempted to approach surrogacy in a manner what 
would best protect all of the parties involved. However, in trying to do so, courts have taken 
different perspectives to the best approach to prevent these potential harms. The current law in 
the United States are inconsistent, leaving parties uncertain of their rights when entering into a 
surrogacy agreement.  
III. Current Law 
In most cases, before a surrogate become pregnant, the contracting parents and the 
surrogate execute an agreement setting forth the terms of the arrangement and indicating who 
will be the parents of the child when the child is born.63 Most surrogacy agreements will never be 
reviewed by a judge because in most cases, the parties comply with the terms of the agreement. 
When they do not, however, they present intractable legal, ethical, and moral questions as we 
have seen. This part examines cases in the United States and the approaches different state courts 
and legislatures have taken when addressing the enforceability and validity of surrogacy 
agreements.  
A. The Perspective of the Courts 
 
                                                 
61 See generally, London, supra note 10, 398-408. 
62 Id.  
63 E.g., In re Baby M, supra note 24, at 411 (explaining that the two parties, the surrogate and the intended parents, 
had entered into a surrogacy agreement).  
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New Jersey 
  Surrogacy entered the spotlight of discussion with the decision of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court case In re Baby M, the first surrogacy case to reach a state supreme court. 64 This 
case involved a traditional surrogacy agreement between Ms. Whitehead, the surrogate, and Mr. 
Stern, the contracting father who was also the genetic father.65 Ms. Whitehead agreed to serve as 
a surrogate for Mr. Stern and his wife, who was unable to conceive and carry a baby to term.66 
Upon the birth of the child, Ms. Whitehead would surrender the child to Mr. Stern and his wife 
as well as renounce her parental rights, allowing Mrs. Stern to legally adopt the child as her 
own.67 However, after the birth of the child, Ms. Whitehead refused to comply with the terms of 
the contract, and refused to deliver Baby M to the Sterns or relinquish her parental rights.68 As a 
result, Mr. Stern filed a complaint to have the surrogacy agreement enforced.69 The New Jersey 
trial court held that the surrogacy agreement was valid and should be enforced, thereby declaring 
Mr. and Mrs. Stern the legal parents of Baby M as stipulated by the contract.70  
Following the decision of the trial court, Ms. Whitehead appealed.71 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the surrogacy agreement 
between Mr. Stern and Mrs. Whitehead was invalid and would not enforce the agreement.72 As a 
result, the Supreme Court retracted Mrs. Stern status as the legal mother and alternatively held 
                                                 
64 E.g., Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1053  (explaining this was the first case to discuss surrogacy).  
65 See generally, In re Baby M, supra note 24, at 411 (discussing the general background information and facts of 
the case). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 412.  
68 Id. at 414-15. 
69 Id. at 415 (filing complaint requesting the enforcement of the surrogacy contract). 
70 See, Id. at 418-19 (concluding that the statutes governing the matter, such as adoption and termination of parental 
rights did not apply to surrogacy contracts because the legislative intent was not to include surrogacy in statutes).  
71 Id. at 419 
72 See, Id. at 421-22 (holding that the surrogacy contract was invalid and unenforceable because it conflicted with 
New Jersey statutes and void against public policy).  
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that Ms. Whitehead was the child’s legal mother.73 The court reasoned that a contract that 
requires an exchange of money for the surrender of a child is void because it is against public 
policy and constitutes “baby-selling.”74 The court held that “our law prohibits paying or 
accepting money in connection with any placement of a child for adoption.”75  Irrespective of the 
Supreme Court’s holding, custody of Baby M was awarded to Mr. and Mrs. Stern in the best 
interest of the child, as the Court reasoned Ms. Whitehead had an unstable home environment to 
raise the child.76 The decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court firmly established that couples 
and surrogates in New Jersey entering into surrogacy agreements would not be afforded 
protection to enforce the agreement from the courts if an issue were to arise.  
 The New Jersey Supreme Court again addressed the issue of surrogacy agreements 
fourteen years following the In re Baby M case in the case In re T.J.S.. 77 However, unlike In re 
Baby M, In re T.J.S. involved a gestational surrogacy agreement.78 The Plaintiffs, T.J.S. and 
A.L.S were married and A.L.S. was unable to carry a baby to term.79 In order to conceive a child, 
the couple decided that T.J.S. would contribute sperm to fertilize the ovum of an anonymous 
donor.80 Once fertilized, the embryo would be implanted into the uterus of A.F.81 The surrogate, 
A.F., entered into the contract with T.J.S. and A.L.S. and was not related to either T.J.S, A.L.S, 
or the ovum donor.82  
                                                 
73 Id.   
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 396. 
76 Id. at 457.  
77 In re T.J.S., 212 N.J. 334 (N.J. 2012)  
78 E.g., See generally, Id. at 335 (indicating that the ovum was to be from that of a anonymous donor, not the 
surrogate). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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 Prior to the birth of the child, T.J.S. and A.L.S. sought an order from the court to declare 
A.L.S. the mother of the child.83 The court entered the order and upon the child’s birth, A.L.S. 
was listed on the child’s birth certificate as the mother in compliance with the order.84 However, 
after the order was issued, the Department of Health and Human Services sought to have the 
order vacated, arguing that it was improper for the court to declare A.L.S. mother because a New 
Jersey state statute, N.J.S.A. 9:3-41(e) stated that a gestational surrogate cannot relinquish her 
parental rights until seventy-two hours after the birth of the child.85 Because A.L.S. was declared 
the mother prior to A.F.’s relinquishing of her parental rights, A.L.S.’ title as mother needed to 
be removed from the birth certificate of the child.86  
 The issue before the court was whether the New Jersey Parentage Act violated the equal 
protection clause by declaring an infertile male the automatic father of a child genetically related 
to his wife who had been artificially inseminated, while failing to recognize an infertile woman 
the automatic mother of a child genetically related to her husband, and that was born to a 
surrogate.87 The trial court granted the state’s motion to vacate the declaration of A.L.S. as the 
legal mother on the birth certificate and held that the New Jersey Parentage Act was 
constitutional.88 In affirming the lower courts, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that “the 
status of maternity is grounded either in a biological or genetic connection to the child.”89 
Because A.L.S. was not biologically related to the child, as she did not gestate the child, or 
                                                 
83 Id. (explaining that the order from the Superior Court would have mandated that the intended mother, A.L.S. 
would have been declared as the mother on the child’s birth certificate at the time of birth).  
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 336, 347; See also, N.J. Stat. § 9:3-41.  
86 See, Id. at 336 (explaining that the Department of Health and Human Services said there was no basis for the relief 
that the plaintiffs requested and therefore the relief was invalid). 
87 See generally, Id. at 334 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 336.  
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genetically related, as A.L.S. did not provide the ovum, the only option that remained to declare 
A.L.S as the mother was though adoption.90  
 California 
Five years after the New Jersey Supreme Court decided In re Baby M, the California 
Supreme Court addressed the enforceability of a gestational surrogacy contract in Johnson v. 
Calvert.91 Mr. and Mrs. Calvert entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with Anna 
Johnson.92 Anna Johnson agreed to carry to term an embryo created with the Calvert’s gametes.93 
Just as In re Baby M and In re T.J.S., Ms. Johnson agreed to surrender all parental rights upon 
the birth of the child.94 However, the relationship between the Calverts and Ms. Johnson 
deteriorated during the pregnancy and as a result, Ms. Johnson refused to relinquish the baby to 
the Calverts.95  
At the birth of the child, both women claimed to be the child’s mother.96 Mrs. Calvert, the 
intended mother, claimed to be the mother because the child was genetically hers.97 
Alternatively, Ms. Johnson, the surrogate, claimed to be the mother because the child was 
biologically hers as she had gestated the child.98 Unlike the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re 
Baby M, the California Supreme Court enforced the surrogacy contract and concluded that in 
gestational surrogacy agreements, the intent of the parties would be a dispositive factor in 
                                                 
90 Id. 
91 Johnson v. Calvert, 5. Cal. 4th 84 (Cal. 1993). 
92 Id. at 87 
93 Id. (indicating that the surrogacy agreement was a gestational surrogacy). 
94 Id.  
95 Id. at 87-88  
96 Id. at 88.  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
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deciding parentage.99 Therefore, because Mr. and Mrs. Calvert were the intended parents, they 
were the child’s legal parents.100  
Five years after Calvert v. Johnson was decided, the California Court of Appeals held in 
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, that gestational surrogacy agreements are enforceable even if the 
intended parents are not genetically related to the child so long as the surrogate herself was not 
genetically related to the child.101 The court reasoned that the intended parents would be the legal 
parents of the child because it was their consent to a medical procedure that caused the 
procreation of a child.102 But for the actions of the intended parents, the child would not have 
come to existence.103 The court iterated that “the people who ‘choose’ to bring a child into being 
are likely to have the child’s best interest at heart,” and therefore, the legal parents should be the 
intended parents.104 
Tennessee 
The Tennessee Supreme Court in the matter, In re C.K.G. determined that the intent of 
the parties involved would not be a dispositive factor, but that it should be taken in consideration 
when determining parentage.105  In In re C.K.G., Dr. Charles K.G. and Ms. Cindy C. decided to 
have a child and pursued in vitro fertilization through a fertility clinic.106 Although the parties 
were not married, both parties understood and expected that they would raise the children 
                                                 
99 Id. at 93 (stating that when one woman contributes genetically to the child and the other biologically as the 
gestator, the woman that intended to procreate the child is the natural mother under California law. 
100 Id. 
101 In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 1410 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
102  Id. at 1410. 
103 Id. at 1425-26 
104 Id. at 1425 
105 See generally, In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 728  (Tenn. 2005) (explaining that the court is declining to adopt 
the intent test of California, but will consider intent amongst other factors when examining the facts of a particular 
case). 
106  Id. at 717 
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together.107 Because of Cindy’s age, the two parties agreed to enter into a joint contract that 
stated that Cindy would use an anonymous donor ovum and Charles’ sperm to conceive the child 
and explicitly included that although the children would not be genetically related to Cindy, she 
would be the mother of any children born to her as a result of the egg donation.108 Both parties 
signed the contract and soon after the implementation of the embryos, Cindy became pregnant 
with triplets.109 At the birth of the children, the birth certificate listed Cindy as the mother and 
Charles as the father.110 
After the children were born, the relationship between Charles and Cindy deteriorated.111 
Charles became distant and less involved with the children and withheld financial support from 
Cindy and his children.112 As a result, Cindy sought to have parentage established and wanted to 
obtain custody of the children and child support from Charles.113 In response, Charles argued that 
Cindy was not the mother of the children because she lacked a genetic connection.114 In response 
to the petition, the juvenile court held that Cindy “is the birth mother and always had the intent to 
bring these children for herself and Charles.”115 The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile 
court’s decision and adopted the intent test established in Johnson v. Calvert, holding that the 
issue of who the parents of the children are should be determined by examining the intent of the 
parties and not only genetic contribution.116 However, the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused 
                                                 
107 Id. at 718 
108 Id. at 717 
109 Id. at 718  
110 Id.  
111 Id.   
112 Id.  
113 Id. (explaining that Cindy filed a petition in the juvenile court to establish parentage to obtain custody and child 
support for her children). 
114 Id.  
115 Id. at 719 
116 Id.  
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to adopt the intent test.117 Instead, the Court decided that to determine the enforceability of the 
agreement in declaring the mother of the children, they would look at particular factors in 
making their decision.118 In their case analysis, the Court held that the relevant factors in 
determining motherhood were: genetics, intent, gestation, and the absence of controversy 
between the gestator and the genetic “mother.”119 In examining these four factors, the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee concluded that Cindy was the legal mother of the children because Cindy 
had the intent to raise the children, had gestated the children creating a biological connection, 
and the genetic mother was an anonymous ovum donor who was not seeking parental rights or 
status.120 
In an attempt to address the moral, ethical and legal concerns associated with surrogacy 
agreements, three different state courts provided three different approaches for determining the 
legal mother of the child born via a surrogate. The inconsistency in approaches determined by 
the court to provide for the best interests of all the parties involved is troublesome for parties 
contemplating entering into surrogacy agreements, as it may be unclear what their rights are if 
the relationship were to deteriorate or an issue were to arise. Therefore, an examination of other 
surrogacy models may provide a solution for the United States in helping to guide courts when 
determining motherhood and the validity and enforceability of surrogacy arrangements.  
 
IV. The Model Across the Pond: A Look at Surrogacy In the United Kingdom  
Because courts in the United States have continued to adopt different approaches for 
determining parentage in surrogacy agreement, couples and surrogates who enter into the 
                                                 
117 Id. at 726. (refusing to adopt either the intent test as a general rule for determining parentage with surrogacy 
agreements). 
118 Id. at 727 
119 Id. at 727-30.  
120 See, Id.  
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agreements are left with constant uncertainty of how a court is likely to decide the outcome of 
the case if an issue were to arise. In order to provide certainty and consistency to the parties of 
surrogacy contracts, the United States should adopt an approach to surrogacy agreements similar 
to that of the United Kingdom. 
The United Kingdom’s first impression with surrogacy was in 1985 when the first child, 
Baby Cotton, was born via a surrogate in the country.121 At the time, the United Kingdom did not 
have a statute that legally banned the practice of surrogacy.122  However, prior to the birth of 
Baby Cotton the United Kingdom government had commissioned a committee, the Warnock 
Committee, to investigate advanced reproductive technologies such as surrogacy.123  Based upon 
the recommendations of the committee, the government enacted the Surrogacy Arrangements 
Act of 1985.124  
The Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 is a uniform law that made it a criminal offense for 
any party of the surrogacy arrangement to receive financial benefit for participating in the 
arrangement.125 A person violates this provision of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 if 
they: “(a ) initiate or take part in any negotiations with a view to the making of a surrogacy 
arrangement, (b) offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement, or (c) 
compile any information with a view to its use in making, or negotiating the making of, 
surrogacy arrangement.”126  If a party to the arrangement or a third party, such as members of the 
surrogate or intended parent’s family, are found to have made or received payments in violation 
                                                 
121 See, Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and 
Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime , 10 CONN. PUB. INT . L.J. 477, 492 (2011).  
122 Id.  
123 Id. at 492-93 
124 Id. at 493  
125 See generally, Surrogacy Arrangements Act, 1985, c. 49 (1985), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/49 (detailing the possible penalties that could result from a violation of 
the Act).  
126 Id. (explaining what constitutes a violation of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act) 
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of this section of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, the individual faces the possibility of 
a monetary fine or imprisonment not exceeding 3 months time.127 
Although the committee recommended that criminal law penalties be implemented to deter 
commercialized surrogacy, the committee did not reject surrogacy arrangements wholly.128 
Instead, the committee recommended the allowance of altruistically motivated surrogacy 
arrangements without punishment.129 In arrangements motivated by altruism, there is no 
exchange of money for services rendered, but the government does allow the surrogate to be 
compensated for “reasonable expenses.”130 However, the government did not elaborate or define 
what would consist a reasonable expense.131 
In addition to requiring surrogacy arrangements be non-commercialized, the United 
Kingdom also recommends that the intended parents of the child should be listed as the parents 
on the birth certification in order to help avoid litigation.132 In support of the decision to list the 
intended parents on the birth certificate, the United Kingdom examined other areas of law and 
circumstances that had arisen.133 
A. Problems with the Approach Taken by the United Kingdom 
One criticism of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985 is that the Act never defined what 
constitutes a “reasonable expense” leaving uncertainty as to whether a payment is a violation of 
                                                 
127 See, Id. (explaining that an individual does not have to be a party to a surrogacy arrangement in order to be 
subject to the penalties of the Act).  
128 Id. 
129 See, Caster, supra note 121, at 493 (arguing that the United Kingdom only invalidated surrogacy arrangements 
that involved monetary compensation.   
130 Id. at 494 (allowing for reasonable expenses to be paid to the surrogate, but did not define what constitutes a 
reasonable expense in the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985).  
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 494-95 (allowing the intended parents to be listed on the birth certifications in order to try to prevent 
litigation over parentage and custody).  
133 See generally, Id. at 495 (examining the birth certificates of unwed mothers and the government’s allowance to 
eliminate the father’s name from the birth certificate, indicating that it is not a requirement for birth certification to 
like both biological parents).  
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the Act.134 Because it is the responsibility of the parties to determine what constitutes a 
“reasonable expense,” the seemingly easy to administer law now lends itself to the possibility of 
abuse and leaves the parties with uncertainty as to whether they would be subject to potential 
criminal liability against them.135 
In addition, although the United Kingdom approach recommends the intended mother by 
listed as the mother, the intended mother is not automatically listed as the legal mother of the 
child on the birth certificate.136 Rather, the surrogate is listed on the birth certificate 
automatically as the legal mother because of her biological connection to the child.137 In order 
for the intended mother to be considered the legal mother, the surrogate must sign a parental 
order after the birth transferring her parental rights to the intended mother.138 Because the United 
Kingdom does not consider the surrogacy arrangements binding on the parties, if the surrogate 
deviates from the arrangement and upon the birth refuses to relinquish her parental rights, the 
court will not enforce the order and the intended mother will not be listed on the birth 
certificate.139 Therefore, incapable of predicting how parties to the arrangement will act during 
and after the pregnancy, both intended parents and surrogates have little certainty as to the 
possible outcome of the arrangement upon execution of the contract.  
 
 
                                                 
134 See, Id. at 494 (leaving the decision of what constitutes a reasonable expense to the part ies involved in the 
surrogacy agreement).  
135 See, Id.  
136 See generally, Id. at 494-95 (granting the intended parents the right to have their names included on the birth 
certificate even when there is no biological link between the intended parents and the child). 
137 See generally, gov.uk, Rights for Surrogate Mothers, https://www.gov.uk/rights-for-surrogate-mothers 
(acknowledging that the woman who give birth will always be declared the mother on the birth certificate unless a 
parental order is signed transfer parental rights to the intended parent).   
138 Id.  
139 See, Id (indicating that if there is no violation of the Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1985, then the court will not 
get involved in a dispute between the parties to the contract because the agreement is invalid to the court and the 
default presumption that the woman is gives birth is the mother will be enforced, even if the contract between the 
parties states otherwise).  
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V. Proposals and Recommendations for the United States   
 Because of the advancements to reproductive technology in the last few years, surrogacy 
has involuntarily led us to live in a world where a child may have as many as sixteen potential 
parental combinations.140 As there are approximately six million women that suffer from an 
infertility problem, and as technology continues to advance it is likely that the number of women 
who elect to explore surrogacy or other infertility methods will continue to increase.141 In order 
to avoid excessive litigation and uncertainty as to the parentage of the child, the United States 
must adopt a model of uniform surrogacy regulation, similar to the system enacted in the United 
Kingdom. Authorizing a system in which surrogacy agreements are non-commercial and the 
intended parents are declared the parents of the child will eliminate virtually all of the concerns 
surrogacy agreements are often forced to overcome.  
A. Proposed Law for the United States 
The proposed law that the United States should adopt must be a uniform federal law that 
all states are required to abide by. The law will require that: 
(1) No person in the United States shall engage in commercial surrogacy which includes:  
“(a) initiate or take part in any negotiations with a view to the making of a surrogacy 
arrangement, 
(b) offer or agree to negotiate the making of a surrogacy arrangement, or 
(c) compile any information with a view to its use in making, or negotiating the making 
of, surrogacy arrangements;”142 
(2) All persons engaged in surrogacy arrangements shall: 
 (a) be engaged in the arrangement for altruistic motivations 
(b) make and receive payments through an approved third party organization for the sole 
purpose of medical and legal expenses 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person does an act on a commercial basis if: 
                                                 
140 See, Hill, supra note 1, at 355 (indicating that with the advancement of technology and the ability to separate 
conception and gestation, there are 16 different reproductive combinations, excluding from the number traditional 
conception and childbirth).  
141 See, Cahn, supra note 2, at 1081 (demonstrating that many women in the United States suffer to some extent 
from infertility problems and that 8% of the women in the United States will seek infertility assistance to try to have 
children).  
142 See generally, Surrogacy Arrangements Act, supra note 121 (listing what constitutes commercialized surrogacy 
in violation of the act).   
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(a) any payment is at any time received by himself or another in respect of making, 
negotiating or facilitating the making of any surrogacy agreement.  
 (4) A person guilty of an offence under this Act shall potentially:  
(a) be subject to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment of no more than 6 months time, or 
both. 
(5) Motherhood: 
(a) in defining “motherhood,” the intended mother will automatically be declared to be 
the legal parent on the birth certificate at the birth of the child.  
  
Uniformity of the Law 
Adopting a uniform federal law will eliminate the uncertainty that parties to the 
surrogacy agreement encounter when executing the agreement. Because the courts of the states 
have interpreted “motherhood” using a variety of tests, both the surrogate and the intended 
parents are left with uncertainty of the outcome if the relationship between the parties 
deteriorates. A uniform law declaring the intended parents as the mother and the father on the 
birth certificate at birth will provide consistency and less uncertainty for the parties to the 
agreement. For example, if a child is born in New Jersey to a surrogate, but the surrogacy 
contract was entered into and executed in California, the courts no longer have to decide which 
state has jurisdiction or whether the New Jersey approach to determining motherhood via 
surrogacy or California approach should apply. Instead, both the parties and the courts will be 
certain of the answer prior to entering the agreement because regardless of the jurisdiction, the 
intended parents will be the legal parents.  
Requiring the Surrogate to have an Altruistic Motivation  
The requirement of compensation in exchange for surrogacy services is problematic.143 
Concerns such as the commodification of women and children and the exploitation of women, in 
particular of minorities, are real harms that society needs to be aware of when allowing for the 
                                                 
143 See generally, London, supra note 10, at 398- 208 (illustrating that all of the central concerns regarding 
surrogacy revolve around the transfer of money and compensation).  
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compensation to occur.144  Although the United Kingdom surrogacy model allows for the 
compensation of “reasonable expenses,” the United Kingdom’s lack of guidance on what a 
“reasonable expense” has to the potential to lead to abuse; the exception to the United 
Kingdom’s general rule allows for all the public policy concerns proposed in the United States to 
become a reality.145 Therefore, in order to eliminate the potential of racial and economic 
exploitation and the commodification of women and children, the best option for the United 
States is to adopt a uniform policy that bans commercial surrogacy and allows altruistically 
motivated surrogacy permitting for a surrogate to receive compensation only for medical and 
legal expenses related to the surrogacy arrangement.  
Economic Exploitation 
By eliminating surrogacy compensation for services rendered, the United States will be 
able to reduce the risk of economic and racial exploitation of women. The concern in the United 
States by those who oppose surrogacy is that women who elect to be surrogates are at risk for 
being exploited economically due to the unequal balance of power of the parties to the 
agreement.146  
Requiring an altruistic motivation ensures that women of a lower socioeconomic status 
do not run the risk of being economically exploited, because the financial incentives for both the 
intended parents and the women in a lower socioeconomic status are eliminated. By eliminating 
the financial gain of compensation, women of a lower socioeconomic status have no incentive, 
except for altruism, to undertake the role of a surrogate because they will not receive monetary 
                                                 
144 Id.  
145 See, Caster, supra note 121, at 494 (indicating that because the term was not defined in the act, the parties to the 
arrangements are responsibly for determining reasonableness).   
146 See, London, supra note 10, at 405-06 (arguing that the affluent couples commissioning the surrogacy have the 
power in the agreement because the surrogate women are in need of income that they will agree to work for the 
intended parents at whatever value because there is a lack of alternative employment availability).  
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support. This will protect surrogates from being coerced by men, such as their husbands, to 
become a surrogate for the financial gain. As a result, men in society will no longer feel the need 
to subjugate women to a position of surrogacy because they will receive no financial benefit 
from doing so. Women who will become surrogates will do so because they want to do so, not 
because they are going to receive a financial benefit, exposing them to risk.  
Further, by eliminating the compensation requirement, the potential risk of economic 
exploitation to the intended parents is also eliminated.147 Many intended parents are in a 
vulnerable state, as they desire to have a child and may not be able to bear a child of their own 
for a variety of reasons.148 As many couples who seek surrogacy as an option for reproduction 
are affluent, their desire to have a child may place them at an increased risk of economic 
exploitation by the fertility clinic and also by the lower income women who are aware of the 
affluence of the couple and may prey upon the intended parents vulnerability and desire to elicit 
more compensation in exchange for the child.149 
In order to prevent violations of the federal law, the legalized compensation between the 
surrogate and intended parents for the approved medical and legal expenses should occur though 
a third-party broker. In order to receive a payment, the surrogate must submit an itemized bill 
from the doctor or lawyer indicated the fees in need of payment. The broker would then contact 
the intended parents and inform them of the total costs that is owed. To fulfill the payment, the 
intended parents would provide the fee to the broker, who would in turn, forward the costs to the 
surrogate.  
                                                 
147 See, Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1349 (acknowledging that even though the intended parents are generally better 
situated financially than the surrogate, intended parents have the potential to be economically exploited as well as a 
result of their unwavering desire to have a baby).  
148 Id. n.20 (acknowledging that the factors that makes intended parents most vulnerable to exploitation is a desire 
for children).    
149 See, Id.; See also, Lewin, supra note 58 (demonstrating that intended parents are at risk of economic exploitation 
by fertility clinics).  
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The purpose of the third party is an attempt to minimize the contact between the 
surrogate and the intended parents to reduce the risk that either side is exploited economically, 
either by a demand for more compensation or a refusal to pay. Although the introduction of a 
third party may not be able to eliminate the risk fully, if the exploitation does occur, the parties 
may not feel pressure to acquiesce to the demands because the law will clearly establish that any 
compensatory payment for services is prohibited and the intended parents will be the parents of 
the child at birth.  
Racial Exploitation 
Additionally, with the elimination of compensation, more women will have the 
opportunity to explore surrogacy, which in turn will eliminate the risk of racial exploitation. 
Racial exploitation is a consequence of the economic exploitation risk that surrogacy poses when 
compensation is involved.150 Given the costs of surrogacy in the United States, the evidence 
demonstrates that most women who use a surrogate to have a child are wealthy.151 As minorities 
tend to encompass lower socioeconomic status groups, they inescapably are the group most 
likely to serve as a surrogate for white women in the arrangements.152 However, with the 
elimination of compensation, minority women from lower socioeconomic status who are 
financially motivated will no longer agree desire become a surrogate. By eliminating the 
incentive, financially motivated minority women may choose not to engage in the agreements, 
thereby, diminishing their risk of being viewed as a reproductive slave to the white women’s 
desire.  
                                                 
150 See, London, supra note 10, at 407-09 (arguing that minorities are at risk for being exploited through surrogacy 
arrangements because minorities tend to occupy the lower socioeconomic status demographic that are willing to 
become a surrogate for a low wage for the wealthy upper socioeconomic class, who typically are white, in order to 
guarantee income.  
151 See generally, Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1349.  
152 See, London, supra note 10, at 405-06 .  
 27 
Commodification of Children and Women 
There is also the concern that surrogacy is a commodification of a woman’s body and of 
children.153 However, if the United States adopts the altruistic motivation requirement for 
surrogacy arrangements with the exception of medical and legal expenses, the concern that 
surrogacy baby-selling is eliminated because there is absolutely no monetary exchange for the 
child.  
Just as the concern for baby-selling is eliminated with the prohibited compensation, the 
same is true for the concern that surrogacy is selling women’s bodies and reproductive services. 
Because no compensation is exchanged for the services provided by a surrogate, there is no sale 
and her body and reproductive system is not being treated as a commodity capable of producing 
an income.  
 Best Interest of the Parties 
Furthermore, altruistic surrogacy agreements may be in the best interest of the future 
child, intended parents, and surrogate. The New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Baby M raised the 
concern that surrogacy has the potential to be detrimental to the psychological health of the child 
or the woman.154 However, with the lack of compensation provided, the new law may encourage 
altruistic surrogacy agreements amongst those who know each other. Therefore, if the surrogate 
and intended parents have a relationship, the children may be able to better understand why they 
were not gestated from their genetic mother because they will be able to have a relationship with 
both parties.  
                                                 
153 Id. at 398.  
154 See, In Re Baby M, supra note 24 at 435 (arguing that it is in the bes t interest to keep the child with the natural 
mother because they would have the best interests, but also for the mother because was incapable of realizing the 
effect of the pregnancy).  
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Additionally, commentators have suggested, “only where the surrogate herself finds it a 
positive experience can surrogacy be deemed a success.”155 If the surrogate is motivated by 
altruistic views, rather than in commercial surrogacy, she is more likely to find the experience 
positive because it is something she decided to do, rather than feeling as if she is selling her body 
or is being exploited for her services. 
 Declaration of the Intended Parents 
 The courts in the United States have taken different approaches in determining the 
mother of a child born via surrogacy. As a result, the parties are left with uncertainty as to 
whether they will legally be the mother at the end of the pregnancy. Therefore, to avoid the 
uncertainty of the parties the uniform law should declare a consistent mother of the child, and 
that mother should be the intended mother.  
 The intended mother and father of the child should always be listed as the legal parents 
on the birth certificate because without their initiation and action, the child would not have been 
brought into existence.156 Since the intended parents are the individuals who chose to bring the 
child into existence, it is presumed that they will have the child’s best interest in mind to care for 
the child.157 
 Punishment for Violations 
Just as in the United Kingdom, if the surrogate, intended parents, or third party related to 
either of the parties is determined to have violated the law in regards to compensation, a 
monetary penalty or imprisonment should be imposed. By implementing the potential of a harsh 
                                                 
155 Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1367.  
156 See, Johnson v. Calvert, supra note 91, at 93 (arguing for the adoption of the intended parent test because but for 
the intent to procreate the child – including the creation and raising of the child – the child would not exist).  
157 See, In re Marriage of Buzzanca, supra note 101, at 1425.  
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imprisonment sentence and monetary fine, the goal is deter the parties from participating in the 
violating act.   
B. Enforcement and Compliance of the Law By the Government and Medical Profession 
Enforcement and compliance with the law is imperative to ensure that commercial 
surrogacy arrangements do not occur in the United States. To enforce compliance with the law, 
the United States Department of Health & Human Resources would establish compliance 
guidelines that each state’s Department of Health would be required to abide by in order to 
enforce the federal law.  
Based upon the guidelines established by the U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Resources, each state is required to conduct unannounced inspections at registered fertility 
clinics or offices of doctors that are known or suspected of engaging in fostering surrogacy 
arrangements twice a year. In order to ensure each state complies with this requirement, the 
federal government would have the right to withhold federal funding until the inspections within 
the state are complete.  
During inspections, the inspectors would be required to examine patient records for the 
sole purpose of determining whether surrogacy arrangement documents exist. If a doctor or 
fertility clinic is found to be in violation, the consequences of such a violation would be 
dependent upon whether the violation had occurred previously. A doctor or clinic that is a first 
time violator will be given a monetary fine at a rate to be determined by the individual state’s 
Department of Health & Human Resources. For a second offense, the doctors and facility 
engaged in the practice would be placed on a probationary status and would be required to be 
monitored by the state’s medical licensing board. If the violation continues, the third cited 
violation would result in a revocation of the doctor’s medical license, for no less than 9 months, 
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with the possibility to reapply for their license after a certain period of specified time deemed 
appropriate by the state licensing board. Further, during the time or revocation, the doctor would 
be mandated to attend continuing medical education courses focused on the emotional, ethical 
and legal concerns of surrogacy such as exploitation and commodification of women and 
children. The sanctions are intended to be the minimum that that states would have to enforce, 
but would be permitted to implement more restrictive sanctions if deemed necessary or 
appropriate.  
C. Anticipated Counterarguments 
A major concern in prohibited commercialized surrogacy is that women will not want to 
be surrogates in the United States because there is no financial incentive. As a result, a concern is 
that women exploring surrogacy as a method of reproductive assistance technology to have a 
child will hire a surrogate in another country.158 Surrogacy tourism is common, especially in 
India, where a woman from the United States can hire a surrogate in India for a lower-cost than 
what would be expected as payment in the United States.159 However, the surrogacy market in 
India is unregulated and because the recommended guidelines are not strictly adhered to, it is 
unclear that the surrogates are receiving the proper safety measures.160  If women from United 
States inundate India as a result of lack of willing surrogates in the United States, there is a 
concern that Indian women will continue to be exploited for their reproductive services and at a 
                                                 
158 See, London, supra note 10, at 395 (indicating that international surrogacy arrangement have increased over the 
last few years, as a result of laws in other countries being restrictive in regards to engaging in surrogacy as a 
reproductive technology).  
159 See generally, London, supra note 10, at 395 (providing a brief background of the surrogacy arrangements in the 
popular surrogacy destination, India).   
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higher frequency if the demand for surrogates increases as a result of noncommercialized 
surrogacy in the United States.161 
However, there is a solution to this concern that would not prevent the United States from 
adopting the proposed model.  In order to deter citizens of the United States from going abroad 
to engage in commercial surrogacy agreements that may be exploiting women worldwide, the 
United States could include in the proposed law that, if a United States citizen enters into a 
contract and engages in commercial surrogacy abroad, the child born via the surrogate will not 
be granted legal status in the United States. Knowing that the child may not legally be able to 
enter, reside or eventually obtain citizenship of the United States may be a deterrent strong 
enough to prevent surrogacy tourism and in turn, the exploitation of women abroad.  
Another potential criticism of the proposed plan is that economic exploitation may still 
exist because including a third party broker cannot prevent either the surrogate or the intended 
parent from contacting the other party personally and either offering or demanding compensation 
without the broker’s knowledge. Unfortunately, there is always the potential that surrogates may 
contact intended parents outside of the agency and demand more money and there is also always 
the potential that given how appreciative intended parents may be, they may desire to provide 
financial compensation to demonstrate their gratitude. 
In examining non-commercial surrogacy agreements, it could be argued that it is 
implausible to believe that women will continue to become surrogates and undergo nine months 
of pregnancy for a stranger if no financial compensation is provided. However, because 
surrogacy would allow for existence only when altruistically motivated, surrogacy agreements 
                                                 
161 See, Id. (Indian women who are surrogates are already exploited in the surrogacy arrangements because many of 
the women who choose to participate in the arrangement do so under extreme economic and social pressures; by 
prohibiting compensation in the United States , less surrogate may be available domestically and may encourage 
women to go abroad, to countries that have already exploited their women and surrogates).  
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might become more common between friends and family members, in order to help those closest 
to them to achieve a achieve a family. In fact, a move in the direction of the surrogate and 
intended parents having a pre-existing relationship may be most beneficial for the surrogate, the 
intended parents and for the child. Research that has been conducted to determine whether 
surrogacy agreement has been is a successful has indicated that “construction of a positive 
relationship between the surrogate and the intended parents” is one factor to ensure a successful 
surrogacy agreement.162 When the surrogate is invested in the same outcome as the intended 
parent research has shown that is when both parties report the most successful surrogacy 
experiences.163 This is most likely to occur when the parties have a good relationship and a key 
component of that relationship must be based on trust.164 
Additionally, as highlighted in In re Baby M, the fears that a surrogate is not capable of 
making an informed decision and will later refuse to give up the child to the intended parents are 
dissuaded by allowing for surrogacy on altruistic motive for two reasons. One reason is that if an 
altruistic requirement begins to encourage friends and families of intended parents to act as 
surrogates, the more likely it is that the surrogate will be able to remain in the child’s life after 
the birth and relinquishing of custody to the intended parents. The surrogate would still be able 
to interact with the child, and further the potential pre-existing bond between the surrogate and 
the child. Secondly, allowing surrogacy only for altruistic motivations allows both the intended 
parents and the surrogate to be invested in the same outcome: the well-being and delivery of a 
child. If other compounding factors, such as money, are considered, surrogates and intended 
parents may no longer be invested in the same outcome, an essential component for a successful 
                                                 
162 See, Shapiro, supra note 56, at 1366 (discussing what factors are likely to make a surrogacy arrangement 
successful).  
163 Id. at 1367. 
164 Id.  
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surrogacy agreement, because the compensation will force the surrogate to misplace her loyalties 
not to the child, but upon the compensation she is receiving.  
Therefore, even though the proposed uniform law presents the potential of promoting 
surrogacy tourism and exploiting women abroad given that women in the United States may no 
longer consider participating in the agreements due to the lack of financial gain, the United 
States can enact a statute denying the child legal U.S. citizenship in an attempt to deter couples 
from going abroad to participate in commercial surrogacy. Furthermore, even if the potential 
number of surrogates in the United States diminishes as a result no financial compensation, this 
could result in the best interest of the child. With no compensation, surrogacy may begin to occur 
between close family and friends to help those closest to them achieve their desire to have a 
family. As a result of the pre-existing relationship, the best interests of the child may promoted 
by this surrogacy relationship, as the child will be able to maintain a relationship with both 
women and better understand the complexity of the relationship. Although these are concerns 
that must be considered, they should not be dispositive of the uniform altruistic surrogacy 
arrangement model proposed for the United States.  
VI. Conclusion 
As the medical technologies have advanced, the courts have been left to play catch-up in 
trying to determine what the best course of action is for all the parties involved. The silence of 
the government is no longer an acceptable approach to dealing with this technology, and 
legislation must be passed to ensure the rights of all those involved.  
Many public policy concerns have been raised in deciding whether to allow for the 
existence of surrogacy arrangements. There is one model presently that will allow the United 
States to combat all of these concerns with one simple statute, and that is model of the United 
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Kingdom. In creating a model similar to the United Kingdom, the United States should adopt a 
uniform surrogacy agreement that is motivated by altruism, criminalizes any form of 
compensation, with the exception of legal and medical expenses, and provides that the intended 
parents of the child will always be listed on the birth certificate as the legal parents. With this 
model, not only will the United States be able to curb the opponents’ concerns, but the 
government will be able to provide for the best interest of the child, the surrogate, and the 
intended parents.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
